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Introduction 
 
This paper is concerned not so much with the substantive results of evaluation 
research concerning safety and crime prevention policies as with the question of the 
evaluability of community crime prevention, using examples from studies carried out 
in England and Wales. The concept of evaluability refers to those aspects of the 
institutional context of an intervention that affect the methodology of evaluation 
applied, and the validity of inferences drawn from applying that methodology. Unlike 
the discussion of methodology per se, the analysis of evaluability is a reflexive 
approach to criticism that seeks to give an account of how institutional context (the 
circumstances in which a particular evaluation is carried out) is related to the 
particular methodological approach adopted. The reflexive study of evaluability is far 
less developed than the study of evaluation method itself, yet the governance issues 
involved in evaluation research often have a crucial influence on its design, conduct 
and findings. Just as contemporary British governments have invested heavily in the 
evaluation of community crime prevention, so governance issues have had a critical 
impact on their evaluability. 
 
 
Why evaluate? - The scientific case 
 
From the social scientific point of view, the classic statement about the purpose of 
evaluation research is Campbell (1969). Drawing upon the ethos of the ‘Great 
Society’ programmes of 1960s America, Campbell argued that an ‘experimenting 
society’ would be a ‘good society’ because social and political learning would be 
advanced by the application of scientific method. The use of scientific criteria to 
inform political choice would consequently lead to progress in the social policy 
sphere just as it seems to do in the field of medical science. Nevertheless, Campbell 
also saw the need to establish an experimental ethos in public administration for 
attaining this goal.  The chief obstacle to establishing this ethos was not the absence 
of knowledge to experiment with, nor even the practical difficulties of implementing 
scientific methods of evaluation (which are the subject of evaluation research 
methodology), but the political obstacles in the way of informed social learning and 
choice stemming from the nature of governance itself. As well as placing science as a 
methodological tool for governments to use, in Campbell’s vision of the reform 
society, science would also need to be a methodological tool with which to hold 
government accountable for its actions to a wider public interest. Without an external 
(publicly-accessible) method of accounting for political choice, public administrators 
have built-in incentives not only to avoid critical scrutiny of their public record and 
achievements but also for making political capital by claiming success for what they 
have purportedly done. Thus, the rigorous application of objective scientific method 
aspires to raise evaluation research above politics; providing evidence of What Works 
on a supposedly less partial and partisan basis than that of political discourse and 
competition. 
 
Why evaluate? - The political case  
  
Usually in the UK, the type of community crime prevention intervention, where and 
on what it should be targeted, and who should benefit, are decided in advance by the 
sponsors. There are very few examples of ‘spontaneous’ community self-help and 
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self-organisation. Aside from the academic study of ‘social movements’ (covering 
spontaneous community action), evaluation research is itself an applied research 
activity intimately tied-up with the process of government. Community crime 
prevention programmes are interventions by government into civil society and it is the 
nature of these interventions, and their sponsors’ needs, that affect their evaluability. 
In the UK, the sponsors of community crime prevention are usually the national 
government, and the purpose of these interventions is to implement its policies2. Thus, 
in answer to the question “why evaluate?” there are three motives or purposes that 
government sponsors have in commissioning or engaging with evaluation research:  
 
1. Accountability – the view that a government’s actions should be subject to 
some means of scrutiny accessible to those who elect it. Social scientific 
research methods are thus regarded as a superior means for ensuring political 
accountability. 
2. Technology – the view that the evaluation of governmental programmes will 
reveal information that will provide a ‘blue-print’ for what to do and how to 
do it. Social scientific research methods are thus regarded as a superior means 
for developing a technology of governance that will help with the engineering 
of social reform – that is, to discover ‘what works’.  
3. Validation – the view (often a political perception) that the purpose of 
evaluation is to provide proof of the desirability of a policy (and its sponsors) 
and/or its superiority vis-à-vis that of policy (and political) alternatives – that 
is, to demonstrate ‘what works’. 
 
Since evaluation is a political process, these three ‘political’ considerations have each 
played a crucial role in the conduct of evaluation research on community crime 
prevention. Distinctions in British policy and practice between them have become 
blurred and confused (Hope, 2002a), sometimes intentionally (Hope, 2004).  
 
                                                 
2
 This pattern tends to reflect the form of public administration in The United 
Kingdom. The UK is a unitary state, whose central government is accountable to the 
UK Parliament, consisting of three separate jurisdictions – England and Wales 
(containing the great majority of the population of the UK), Scotland, and Northern 
Ireland. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland possess their own devolved 
governments, though their statutory powers vary considerably both amongst 
themselves and vis-à-vis the UK government. Sub-nationally, there are separate, 
directly elected local governments and non-elected public authorities (including 
separate police authorities) that have limited tax-raising powers but cannot act ultra 
vires of national legislation.  In all cases, the great majority of revenue required to 
fund local public services is collected by central government, and is subsequently 
disbursed to local administrations, with varying degrees of local government 
responsibility and central government fiscal control. In recent years, central 
government expenditure has been tied to public service performance regimes set by 
legislation (Hope, 2002).  
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Part 1: the evaluation of safety and crime prevention policy in England and 
Wales 
 
This paper is concerned with research in England and Wales aimed at evaluating 
community crime prevention, which is defined as interventions aimed at changing the 
social conditions that are believed to sustain crime and insecurity in common 
environments, most often residential communities (Hope, 1995). Specifically, 
interventions often aim to change the institutional structure of local communities in 
ways that increase the exercise of social control both by private citizens and the 
authorities (Hope and Karstedt, 2003; Hope, 1998; 1995; Foster and Hope, 1993). 
‘Institutions’ and ‘social control’ can be defined as both informal and formal – 
examples of which are given in Figure 1. In essence, these are interventions that 
address residential places (neighbourhoods) as holistic entities (communities) which 
encapsulate their own internal social relations and dynamics, including the interaction 
of formal and informal institutions to ‘co-produce’ safety in common environments 
(Hope, 1995). As such, they are Comprehensive Community Initiatives – CCIs 
(Connell and Kubisch, 1998). 
 
Figure 1: Dimensions of community crime prevention 
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Types of programmes 
 
There have been two generic kinds of central government programme with potential 
to affect community safety: 
 
1. Crime Prevention. Large-scale programmes in England and Wales have included 
the Safer Cities Programmes and the Crime Reduction Programme, along with 
funds available through regional programmes to fund local authority projects, 
since 1998 via the local government machinery of Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships (Hope, 2005, 2002). These programmes have included the range of 
activities described in Figure 1. Notable investments have been in Neighbourhood 
Watch, public Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV), and Street-Lighting.  There has 
also been a steady investment in community policing, including Problem-Oriented 
Policing, Reassurance Policing and, most recently, Neighbourhood Policing. In 
most of these funding programmes, the projects have been small-scale 
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‘demonstration projects’ targeted on local neighbourhoods. In general, authorities 
seek to deliver specific crime prevention services to communities. Sometimes 
these are evaluated for cost-effectiveness, and sometimes they have been 
accompanied, or comprise part of, national programme-level evaluations. A 
common governance theme is partnership - between central and local government, 
between governmental agencies (e.g. local government and police services), and 
between these bodies and civil society (whether private citizens or corporate 
bodies). Nevertheless, there are also power structures, hierarchies and 
organisational cultures amongst agents that affect how they interact together ‘in 
partnership’ and how and what outcomes are produced. 
 
2. Urban Regeneration. Community safety has also been one of the objectives of 
urban regeneration programmes, though it has not been an exclusive or sole 
objective. In contrast to the direct effects of programmes delivering specific crime 
prevention, regeneration programmes tend to address community conditions that 
give rise to crime - including those of social exclusion and community 
empowerment – thereby setting in train community-level change that leads to 
greater social control (Hope, 2005). From the 1970s onwards, regeneration 
programmes have become increasingly focussed and specific, moving away from 
main-stream funding towards more targeted demonstration programmes. National 
programmes have included: the Priority Estates Project (PEP), the Design 
Improvement Controlled Experiment (DICE), the Single Regeneration Budget 
programme (SRB), and most recently, the New Deal for Communities (NDC) and 
Housing Market Renewal (HMR) programmes.  During the course of this 
development, community safety has become an increasingly salient, and 
distinctive, part of the package of issues to be addressed.   
 
Evaluation research into community crime prevention 
 
The history of evaluation research in community crime prevention mirrors the 
development of crime prevention policy and practice in the UK. Key evaluation 
studies have included3: 
 
1. The Home Office Crime Prevention Feasibility Study. This was aimed at 
demonstrating the application of systematic (evidence-based) prevention and 
multi-agency partnership working (Hope and Murphy, 1983; Gladstone, 1980). 
The research utilised an action-research, case-study methodology.  
 
2. Neighbourhood Watch.  An evaluation of the impact of a pilot Neighbourhood 
Watch programme in two residential neighbourhoods, utilising a quasi-
experimental research design (Bennett, 1990). This study also introduced the use 
of social survey data as a source of measures of impact (see also studies 3, 4, and 
6). 
 
3. Community Policing (Fear Reduction). A quasi-experimental evaluation of a 
policing initiative aiming to reduce fear of crime and improve the quality of life of 
residents on two residential estates (Bennett, 1991). 
                                                 
3
 This is a selective rather than comprehensive list, selected to represent key issues or developments in 
evaluation methodology, discussed in Part 2. 
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4. Priority Estates Project Evaluation Study. A quasi-experimental evaluation of the 
effect on community safety of a housing environmental and management (urban 
regeneration) programme on two estates in two different English cities (Foster and 
Hope, 1993).  
  
5. The Kirkholt Burglary Reduction Project (Repeat Victimisation). A multi-agency 
initiative, including situational, offender-based, and social prevention measures 
(Forrester et al., 1990; 1988). It has since become famous for pioneering the 
prevention of repeat victimization and for being considered an early exemplar of 
‘realist’ evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). The Kirkholt Project has spawned a 
number of evaluations in the UK and elsewhere focusing on repeat victimization 
prevention (Farrell, 2005).  
  
6. The Safer Cities Programme. A multi-agency, multiplex, multi-site crime prevention 
programme. Phase 1 ran from 1988-1995, funded and managed by the Home Office; 
(Phase 2 ran between 1994 and 1998 funded and managed by the ministry for local 
government). The Programme itself was monitored administratively (Knox et al., 
2000). A key focus of Phase 1 was the prevention of burglary: using Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) technology and micro-econometric modelling 
techniques, Ekblom et al. (1996), carried out probably the most statistically 
sophisticated study in an effort to measure programme intensity and incorporate 
selection bias (see below). Other, smaller scale evaluation studies also focused on 
burglary, though using mainly qualitative techniques within a ‘realist’ approach 
(Tilley 1993; Tilley and Webb, 1994). 
  
7. Design Improvement Controlled Experiment (DICE). Carried out between 1989 and 
1997, DICE consisted of radical design improvement schemes on selected council 
housing estates in England, the evaluation used mixed methods (including surveys) 
to evaluate the impact, costs and benefits of the schemes. 
(http://www.communities.gov.uk/archived/general-
content/citiesandregions/221449/). 
  
8. The Crime Reduction Programme (CRP), 1999-2002.  This was the largest 
programme of community-based crime prevention ever attempted in the UK, with an 
original budget of £250 million (315 million euros, approx.), allocated mainly to 
local projects, focusing upon different, thematic, crime problems, with 10 per cent 
ear-marked for independent evaluation studies of cost-effectiveness (Maguire, 2004). 
Apparently, more than 80 evaluation reports were produced, though fewer than that 
have been published (Hope, 2008). The most intensively evaluated component of the 
CRP was the Reducing Burglary Initiative – Phase 1 (Hope, et al., 2004; Hirschfield 
2004; Millie and Hough, 2004; Bowles and Pradiptyo, 2004; Kodz et al., 2004). 
The CRP also contained a programme of around £150-£200 million (189 – 252 
million euros, approx.) for CCTV systems in local areas, which has also been 
evaluated (Gill and Spriggs, 2005). 
  
9. Community Policing (Reassurance Policing/Neighbourhood Policing). 
“Reassurance Policing is a model of neighbourhood policing which seeks to 
improve public confidence in policing by involving local communities in identifying 
priority crime and disorder issues in their neighbourhood which they then tackle 
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together with the police and other public services and partners” 
(http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/policing17.htm). There was 
evaluation of the outcomes of the National Reassurance Policing Programme 
(NRPP) in England between 2003/04 and 2004/05 (Tuffin et al., 2006). “…The 
implementation of neighbourhood policing has represented a significant undertaking 
for the Government, police service and their partners. Neighbourhood policing was 
initially piloted at a ward level as part of the [NRPP]. Following [this] the three-year 
Neighbourhood Policing Programme (NPP) was officially launched in April 2005, 
and has sought to deliver on the Government’s commitment for every 
neighbourhood in England and Wales to have a neighbourhood policing team by 
2008” Quinton and Morris, 2008: iv); an early-stages evaluation report is available 
(ibid.). 
 
Part 2: the evaluability of community crime prevention 
 
Evidence-Based Policy and Practice? 
 
British central governments have invested heavily in crime prevention over the past 
Quarter-Century. Since 1997, ‘New Labour’ Governments have specifically coupled 
crime prevention (or, as they call it, Crime and Disorder Reduction) with the 
‘ideological practice’ of Evidence-based Policy and Practice (EBPP), encapsulating 
the policy pursuit of ‘What Works’ (Goldblatt and Lewis, 1998). The public 
administration of EBPP is to be a matter, firstly, of accumulating expert knowledge 
and then having that expertise adopted and applied more generally. The ideal model is 
of an influential and credible government, guided by expert knowledge, 
‘demonstrating’ by practical example that certain programs ‘work’ and thereby 
persuading others to adopt them (Hope and Karstedt, 2003). Tilley and Laycock 
(2000), for example, describes the research and implementation programmes involved 
in the British Government’s development and dissemination of ‘evidence-based’ 
crime prevention policy. Increasingly, the results of evaluations are to be aggregated 
and assessed by systematic review, whose role is to act as a filter and quality-control 
for implementing interventions, based upon methodological criteria concerning the 
‘quality’ of the evidence available from completed evaluation studies. One such set of 
criteria – the Scientific Methods Scale (SMS) (Farrington, 2003) – has become 
increasingly influential as an ostensible criterion for central government evaluation 
research (Hollin, 2008; Hope, 2005c).  
 
The adoption of community crime prevention practices locally is also a continuation 
of project-based demonstration. Thus, once persuaded, those with the authority to act 
are enjoined further to establish and evaluate their own ‘projects’ so that they too can 
demonstrate benefits, both to their constituents as the recipients of prevention, and to 
the public purse, that cost-effectiveness has been achieved. The mode in which 
prevention projects are enjoined to operate conforms, in most respects, to a model of 
rational strategic planning (Hope and Karstedt, 2003; Hope and Sparks, 2000). 
Knowledge of a particular crime problem is to be ascertained in advance of trying to 
implement action, and the selection of services and measures to be delivered is then 
tailored to the key features of crime manifest in the specific target area or group. The 
model of EBPP combines the governance precepts of the ‘New Public Management 
(NPM)’ (Hope, 2002b) with prudential governmental action against social risk 
(O’Malley, 2000). The method of demonstration by practical example is believed to 
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work because those who have the responsibility and authority to take action will be 
shown how to identify prospective benefits accruing in their self-interest, as 
articulators of the interests of their constituents or ‘customers’. They will be thus 
persuaded to take requisite action to maximise the utility of their policies on the basis 
of a calculation of the cost-effectiveness of individual preventive interventions (e.g. 
Sherman et al. 2002). Syntheses of the evidence from evaluation research are used to 
develop practical advice, guidance and ‘tool-kits’ for local practitioners (e.g. 
http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/ ). 
 
The practical problems of rigorous social experimentation are well-known – such 
‘quasi-experiments’ may be difficult to set-up, individual experiments may become 
un-representative, or may involve unethical choices affecting ‘subjects’, the random 
administration of penalties, and the denial of beneficial treatments. The problem for 
policy-makers, though, is a different one – the Martinson Problem (Pawson and 
Tilley, 1997) or, in other words, that programmes may not always be judged to be 
successful despite the ambitions of their sponsors. For the policy-maker, the ‘threat’ 
posed by evaluation research is also different than for the social scientist. Social 
science is oriented towards the avoidance of Type I Error – that is, to avoid 
concluding that a finding is true when it is not. For the policy-maker, however, the 
situation is reversed: although policy-makers who make Type I errors may well incur 
opportunity costs to the wider public interest (i.e. by diverting resources towards 
ineffectual programmes and away from desirable policies), the direct political costs of 
making alternative Type II Errors (i.e. to conclude that a finding is false when it is 
true) are much greater – risking throwing away their programmes and their credibility 
needlessly. Thus, evaluation research always contains the potential to threaten the 
political capital vested in social programmes.  
 
Evaluation research embodies a political dilemma – that the price to be paid for 
insisting on methodological rigour on the grounds both of scientific quality and 
democratic accountability may well be a lack of utility for policy-makers (Hope, 
2002a). The Martinson Problem (arising from an earlier era of evaluation of 
sentencing and penal treatment), is that the rigour of evaluation research is perceived 
by policy-makers to heighten the probability of reaching ‘Nothing Works’ 
conclusions.  What may serve the public interest in one way – i.e. by holding 
government accountable – may hinder it in another – i.e. by inhibiting government 
from finding out “what works”, thereby inhibiting political progress.  There would 
thus be considerable advantage to be gained if it were possible to preserve the 
safeguards of validity inherent in ‘scientific method’ while at the same time producing 
useful results of “what works”. Nevertheless, when push comes to shove, the greater 
resources of persuasion available to politics than to science can mean an uneven 
contest in which methodology comes to be sacrificed to political expediency (Hope, 
2004).  
 
For all its promises and inducements to social scientists, the ideology of EBPP can be 
used as a means of exerting political control over the conduct of evaluation research 
in order to validate and legitimise government policy (Hope, in press). EBPP invokes 
the aura of science to gain support and consent for policy (Campbell, 1969). In this 
sense, the ‘evidence’ generated from evaluation research, resting as it does on 
apparently scientific foundations, can be used politically as an unassailable means of 
supporting Government policies (Hope, 2006). As experienced during an evaluation 
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of part of the Reducing Burglary Initiative of the Home Office Crime Reduction 
Programme (1999-2003), this stratagem puts pressure on evaluation researchers to 
produce the ‘correct’ findings (STC, 2006), leading contracted researchers to 
compromise on research quality standards; and government to commission alternative 
congenial research (Hope, 2004) and/or to ignore, distort, or suppress the findings of 
the research that it has commissioned (Hope, 2008).  
 
The logic of evaluation research 
 
The purpose of evaluation research is causal attribution – specifically, to assess the 
extent to which the deliberate implementation of policy intervention X changes 
substantially an identified crime/security phenomenon Y. Attaching a value to this 
assessment (cost-effectiveness) is an important, though secondary, purpose since it 
depends upon the identification of the scale of effect. The methodological task is to 
identify the unique effect of the intervention, net of other influences. Thus, evaluation 
methodology has the two-fold task of estimating the unique effect of an intervention, 
while ensuring that such estimates are valid representations of true effects, primarily 
by protecting against bias in the production of the estimates.   
 
The simplest conception of an evaluation is in the form of a ‘black box’ experiment 
(see Figure 2), where a particular intervention is conceptualised as a ‘treatment’ 
applied to a group of subjects and an estimate is obtained of the mean effect of the 
treatment on the subject group. The treatment is causally prior to the effect.  
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation methodology has evolved to solve the fundamental evaluation problem 
that this conception poses. As Heckman and Smith (1995) put it, this arises from:  
 
Black-box Experiment
Treatment Experiment Mean 
Effect
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“…the impossibility of observing what would happen to a given person [or 
community] in both the state where he or she receives a treatment (or 
participates in a program) and the state where he or she does not. If a person 
could be observed in both states, the impact of the treatment could be 
calculated by comparing his or her outcomes in the two states, and the 
evaluation problem would be solved”. (ibid: 87)   
 
Evaluation methodology should thus be concerned with the operationalisation of 
methods that support the valid estimation of the effect of being subject to an 
intervention, net of alternative, counter-factual conditions that the subject could 
experience. Empirically, we only have available the observable ‘fact’ of being subject 
to the intervention. Since we cannot observe what would have happened if the 
intervention had not happened (i.e. the counter-factual condition), we have no certain 
means of knowing what factors ‘caused’ the specific conditions observed in the 
subject during and after the intervention. Because the counter-factual is unobservable, 
we cannot evaluate the actual probability of the effect occurring against the un-
actualised probability of it not occurring.  
 
In the experimental design (Figure 3), those persons assigned to non-exposed 
conditions represent the counterfactual condition because the process of random 
assignment to the ‘exposed’ and ‘non-exposed’ conditions means that members of 
either group are ‘exchangeable’ and that the subsequently observed differences 
between the two represents the difference between the factual and the counterfactual, 
and hence indicates causation (Hernán and Robins, 2006). It should be noted that 
‘random allocation’ to the control condition does not imply that the experience of the 
control condition is itself ‘random’. Unlike in a laboratory, evaluation research 
applied to social policy interventions takes place in ‘field-settings’ where both the 
experiences of the subjects and the intervention are fundamentally embedded in social 
life, hence the term quasi-experimentation  (Cook and Campbell ,1979). Random 
allocation, therefore, cannot create a vacuum by disembedding subjects from their 
social context; rather, in principle, it ensures that subjects are exchangeable (i.e. have 
identical experiences) so that observed differences can only be due to the unique 
experience of the intervention, which is thus an abstracted aspect of experience that 
only makes sense in terms of the logic of the methodology used to abstract it. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
Yet if randomisation is crucial to the capacity to control the estimation of effects, then 
it is also critical to be able to control randomisation. Community crime prevention 
interventions differ from criminal justice interventions in terms of the styles of 
governance associated with the different institutional settings and programmes 
typically implemented within each sphere (Hope, 2005c). In practice, this shapes the 
ability to exercise control in order to bring about subjects’ compliance with the 
intervention, and hence defines the nature of the intervention itself. Community 
interventions tend to be premised upon mechanisms of collective, voluntary 
participation - for example, where a community group, or non-state agency acting on 
its behalf, is concerned with collective self-advancement; or where a government is 
concerned with the physical, economic or social ‘regeneration’ of a residential area. In 
contrast, the ‘treatment’ programmes taking place in courts and corrections (including 
supervision in community settings) are characterised by individual, constrained 
participation. Typically, they are concerned with altering the rewards and/or sanctions 
bearing upon individuals so that they can ‘fit-in’ to prevailing institutional 
arrangements. Here, ideas about intervention arise from different spheres – of criminal 
justice, education and ‘correction’ - that are, at root, the responsibility of the State - 
the institution with legitimate, judicial powers of coercion over subjects.  
 
Subjects’ participation in community programmes is voluntary because these involve 
the social and institutional arrangements of civil society. The mode of governance in 
civil society is indirect and diffuse – holders of power (government) have to govern 
‘at a distance’, influencing and shaping the setting itself, utilising a range of 
essentially non-coercive measures, in order to engineer the compliance of private 
citizens, including influencing the future behaviour of ‘putative’ as distinct from 
The Experimental Model
Random 
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Treatment Outcome
Control
Effect
Instrumental 
Knowledge
Instrumental 
hypothesis
Social Selection Sample Selection
?
Systematic 
Review
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actual offenders or victims4. In contrast, settings such as courts, prisons and (only to a 
lesser extent) schools, and even labour markets (particularly of the unemployed or low 
waged), include subjects whose participation is largely involuntary or over whom 
power-holders (essentially the state and its agencies) have some considerable 
(ultimately coercive) power of control and influence5. These latter settings differ 
therefore from civil society communities in that they comprise the various arenas 
where there is a greater level of resource for engineering the compliance of subjects 
available to agencies with the authority and legitimacy to bring about change.  
 
The capacity to control subjects directly is crucial not just because it shapes the policy 
conditions that define the intervention but also because it affects the research 
conditions that will define the most appropriate evaluation research methodology. 
Two conditions of control are crucial: the ability to (a) allocate subjects to specific 
research conditions, and (b) command the compliance of agents in implementing 
policy interventions (treatments). The criteria employed to assess methodological 
quality in the Scientific Methods Scale (SMS, noted above) rely principally upon the 
power of control. For instance, a systematic review based upon the SMS quality 
standards, under the heading “what doesn’t work?” listed “…community mobilization 
of residents’ efforts against crime in high-crime, inner city areas of concentrated 
poverty” (Sherman et al., 1998, p. 8), citing Hope (1995) as corroboration 
(erroneously) of this proposition. Yet because of the differential availability of 
coercive control in community relative to criminal justice settings, the application of 
the SMS review methodology does not tell us to what extent this conclusion is due to 
the problem of operationalising SMS-favoured methods (of randomisation and 
control) rather than the relative efficacy of each sphere to intervene in crime. Worse, 
comparatively unfavourable inferences could be drawn simply on the basis of 
comparing flawed efforts at experimentation in community settings with competently-
designed and well-executed experiments in settings more amenable to the 
manipulation and control of human subjects (Hope, 2005c).  
 
Methodology of evaluation research 
 
Quasi-experimental methods have evolved to compensate for the difficulties of 
randomisation-by-design encountered by applying experimental designs in field-
settings (Figure 4). Essentially, they rely upon statistical adjustment to compensate for 
the absence of the capacity to control by design (Judd and Kenny, 1981). The 
evaluations of Neighbourhood Watch (Study 2), Community Policing (Study 3), 
Priority Estates Project (Study 4), DICE (Study 7) and Community Policing (Study 9) 
have all employed a similar design: non-randomised matching of ‘experimental’ and 
‘control’ sites, using regression adjustment methods applied social survey data to 
estimate treatment effects, net of the effect of measured covariates (i.e. social 
characteristics of residents correlated with the outcome variable) that might differ 
between experimental and control sites (Farrington, 1997).  
   
                                                 
4
 That is, they accord to the sphere of ‘primary crime prevention’ “identifying 
conditions of the physical and social environment that provide opportunities for or 
precipitate criminal acts (Brantingham and Faust, 1976; p. 290). 
5
 Similarly, these accord to the sphere of ‘secondary crime prevention’ (Brantingham 
and Faust, 1976).  
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
The methodological contribution of Campbell and his followers lay in advocating 
research design solutions, short of the pure experiment, to the many various ‘threats’ 
to the validity of programme evaluation research (Cook and Campbell, 1979). 
Essentially, these threats stem from the practical difficulties of implementing valid 
experiments with human subjects in field-settings. In this tradition there are four 
classes of threat to validity (Farrington, 2003): 
 
1. Statistical conclusion validity: whether the hypothesis of a causal relationship 
between intervention and outcome is supported by inferential statistical tests. 
As in all statistical hypothesis testing, there are two test criteria: testing the 
probability that the intervention hypothesis should be accepted (Type I Error 
testing); and testing the probability that the null hypothesis should be rejected 
(Type II Error). Information to assist in these decisions rests, respectively, 
upon the calculation of statistical significance (via the appropriate statistical 
test) and of the size of effect (statistical power calculation) (Farrington, 2003). 
  
2. Internal validity: the key question of inference of a causal relationship 
between intervention and outcome. 
  
3. Construct validity: “…the adequacy of the operational definition and 
measurement of the theoretical constructs that underlie the intervention and 
the outcome” (Farrington, 2003: 54). 
  
4. External validity:  the degree and extent to which we can have confidence that 
the results from a particular intervention can be generalised to other contexts. 
 
The Quasi-Experimental Model
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While there has been much debate about the way in which evaluation methods can 
address these issues, these classes of validity still remain a clear categorisation of the 
nature of the methodological problems encountered in evaluation research. 
 
The realist critique 
 
A crucial difference between a community crime prevention initiative and, say, a 
controlled laboratory experiment is that, in the former, the ‘treatment’ has far less 
integrity a priori. In field-settings, any ‘treatment’ intervention is produced over time 
in specific contexts, in complex practical and organisational ways, utilising varying 
combinations of authority, capital and resources. Moreover, any intervention always 
acts upon a specific context (such as a residential community) and produces its effect 
often through a variety of mechanisms intrinsic to the intervention. Study 3 (Bennett, 
1991) was criticised by Pawson and Tilley (1994) on the basis that its ‘black-box’ 
model of experimental intervention may have concealed a variety of mechanisms 
within the intervention that might have an effect on the outcome; while the statistical 
discounting of covariate differences between sites conceals the likelihood of different 
contexts having separate effects on outcomes (see also Bennett, 1996; Pawson and 
Tilley, 1996). Essentially, their critique is concerned with establishing the greater 
importance of Construct and External Validity, which they suggest has greater 
political and practical relevance, than social scientists’ primary concerns with Internal 
and Conclusion Validity.  
 
Nevertheless, there are incommensurate and contradictory trade-offs amongst the four 
types of validity (Judd and Kenny, 1981). Thus, the critique of the Random 
Controlled Trial (RCT) applied to field-settings is that although it maximises Internal 
and Conclusion Validity, it risks both greater artificiality and oppressive/unethical 
practice (usually both together). Further, in being a practical intervention, in order to 
implement an RCT, it is necessary to abstract it artificially from the social and 
institutional contexts in which its subjects are embedded. Thus, the dilemma of the 
RCT is that the more it maximises internal validity the more it looses on external and 
conclusion validity; the dilemma for the realist critique is the opposite.  
 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) propose an alternative way of conceptualising the 
production of an outcome by hypothesising that any outcome is always the product of 
a particular context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) configuration (Figure 5). The task of 
evaluation is therefore to uncover the variety of CMOs inherent in an intervention and 
then seek additional similar cases (replication) where regularities of policy input can 
be discerned through comparison between variations in CMOs – essentially by 
comparing sequences and collections of case-studies (e.g. Tilley and Webb, 1994). 
Tilley (1993), for example, reports two case-studies that purport to ‘replicate’ the 
Kirkholt Burglary Reduction Project, as part of a process to assess the effectiveness of 
a policy of repeat burglary prevention (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Further replications 
are also held to vindicate the Kirkholt thesis (Farrell, 2005).  
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, this so-called scientific realist method threatens the Internal and 
Conclusion validity of its findings. In particular, it encourages (or insufficiently 
guards against) bias in its selection of case studies and in its investigation of causal 
mechanisms. These difficulties stem both from its methodology – that is, a reliance on 
qualitative, case-study methods - and its epistemology - that is, its inductive method 
of enquiry. For example, ‘replication’ evidence from samples of CMOs (Hope, 
2002a), analysis of national trends (Hope, 2007) and evaluation studies (Hope et al., 
2004) - have found no further instances to date of the mechanism thought to be central 
to the apparent success of the Kirkholt Project – that a change in either the prevalence 
of repeat victims, or the frequency rate of (repeat) victimisation, has any significant 
association with a change in the overall crime (incidence) rate. If anything, it would 
seem that the crime prevalence rate (the proportion of victims in the population) has a 
far greater impact on the crime incidence rate than does the frequency (repetition) rate 
of victimisation (Hope, 2007; 2002a). 
 
The ‘realist’ interpretation of the success of the Kirkholt Project is ex post facto.  This 
opens up ‘realist’ evaluation to the charge of selective interpretation of evidence (a 
fallacy of the inductive method of reasoning) which is not helped by the absence of 
research design and comparison in the case-study method commonly employed. One 
issue concerns that of intent – without establishing what was intended prior to 
implementation, it would not be possible, logically, to establish that what had 
happened was what had been intended. There is always the danger of the ex post facto 
fallacy (post hoc, ergo propter hoc), which is particularly worrying in policy 
evaluation: if original intentions are not met, it may be politically attractive to take 
credit retrospectively for what had actually happened fortuitously, irrespective of any 
Realist Experiment
Mechanism
OutcomePolicy
Context
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particular intention (Campbell, 1969). These problems are compounded by two well-
known problems of selectivity (Hope, 2006; Hope et al., 2004): 
 
1. Selection bias: the difficulty of ‘control’ in community crime prevention (noted 
above) means that projects to be evaluated are never selected at random – more 
usually, they have been selected to participate on some basis that may be related to 
the outcome. Candidates for evaluation may then have already been ‘cherry-picked’ 
for inclusion on their likelihood or promise of success (e.g. if crime has been going 
down previously, or if the implementing agents seem enthusiastic, co-operative, 
competent and efficacious). The problem is compounded, first, when projects are 
selected on a competitive basis; and second, when they are given a ‘pre-launch 
improvement’ – both of which occurred during the Reducing Burglary Initiative 
(Study 8) (Hope, 2004)6. A further consequence of EBPP is that it justifies the 
reporting only of the selection of ‘successful’ case studies, biasing the result 
obtained and inhibiting learning (which may need to analyse failure as much as 
success).  
2. Regression to the Mean: national crime prevention programmes may be targeted on 
high crime areas, on the basis that a greater preventive gain might be attained 
relative to expenditure, as was the case with many projects in the Crime Reduction 
Programme (Study 8). That said, it is then difficult to distinguish the extent to which 
any subsequent reduction is due merely to the phenomenon of regression to the 
mean, at least by the methods usually employed (Hope, 2006; Campbell, 1969).  
 
A related logical problem is that of expectation. The customary antonym in crime 
prevention policy to “what works” is “nothing works” – that is, the expectation that 
action will either have a positive benefit (crime reduction) or a nil-effect. What this 
antonym cannot incorporate is the possibility of unintended but still nevertheless 
significant negative or harmful consequences as a result of crime preventive 
intervention. To the extent that those who propose crime-reductive actions are 
oriented towards political utility, the logical possibility of unintended consequences - 
that actions might cause harm or are more costly than the problem they sought to 
remedy - cannot be countenanced without undermining their rationale of crime 
prevention. This mode of thought does not allow for the logical possibility of crime 
permission: that the specific actions of the programme, regardless of whether or not 
they are intended to reduce it, may nevertheless permit or encourage crime to 
increase. Nevertheless, evidence is available from the Reducing Burglary Initiative 
(Study 8) that the particular activities of a particular crime prevention project – 
ironically focussing specifically on repeat burglary prevention – appeared to have 
brought about a 38 per cent increase in the rate of burglary victimisation, as well as in 
the rate of repeat victimisation (Hope, et al., 2004)7.  
 
In sum, the realist model fails to account for both political selectivity and social 
selectivity and thus becomes vulnerable (whether intentionally or not) to bias (Figure 
6). 
                                                 
6
 And since, as it turned out, neither effort actually guaranteed success, sponsors were simply prompted 
to re-analyse the data so as to come up with sought-after outcomes (Hope, 2004). 
7
 Another occasion for retrospective re-analysis (see fn. 6)!  
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Figure 6 
 
 
 
Programme Mechanisms 
 
Despite its vulnerability to bias in selection and interpretation, the realist approach, 
with its emphasis on the production of prevention, does point to the importance of 
mechanisms – or rather causal sequences – developing over time to generate crime 
prevention outcomes, which the typical ‘black-box’ experimental approach fails to 
capture. Theories of the generation of community crime prevention, based on ideas 
about collective efficacy and social capital, posit causal sequences whereby contextual 
variables interact with intra-community social processes to produce outcomes 
developing over time (Hope and Karstedt, 2003; Hope, 1995). Such processes were 
identified by the ‘mixed methods’ approach of the Priority Estates Project Evaluation 
Study (Study 4) (Foster and Hope, 1993). Social capital theories posit a set of 
necessary interaction effects in order to produce community safety; but it is precisely 
these kinds of interaction effect that the assumptions of the SMS quality criteria 
would construe as ‘threats to validity’8. Broadly, these take the form of two kinds of 
so-called threat:  
 
1. Selection x Treatment. This could itself take two forms: first, where the 
intervention programme cannot be separated from the social and political 
structures in which target communities are embedded. For example, only 
certain kinds of community are likely to support ‘neighbourhood watch’ 
community organisations, thus state-agencies interested in establishing them 
will select only those kinds of communities that provide fertile soil for 
neighbourhood watch groups to flourish, while social processes within such 
                                                 
8
 In the evaluation research literature these are often referred to as ‘moderator’ and ‘mediator’ effects 
on treatment (Farrington, 2003; 1998), though in individual-treatment interventions these appear not to 
be as severe a set of ‘threats’ as they do in community crime prevention.  
The Realist Model 
after Pawson and Tilley (1997)
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communities will also be ‘working’ to capture state resources, creating ‘club 
goods’ of security for themselves (Hope and Trickett, 2004). Arguably, the nil 
effect identified in evaluation studies of Neighbourhood Watch (Study 2 
above) may be due to the similar levels of indigenous social capital present in 
the matched experimental and control communities. Second, as a consequence, 
a kind of ‘elective affinity’ (to use Weber’s term) is established between 
treatment and selection, so that the one cannot operate without the other, to the 
extent that the treatment itself comes to be defined in terms of the selection 
criteria (i.e. the characteristics of the setting). 
  
2. Treatment x Outcome. The objective of the SMS quality scale is to ensure that 
it is the treatment that causes the outcome – termed Conclusion I (Judd and 
Kenny, 1981). However, there are two other relations between treatment and 
outcome that, although they more accurately define the process of change, 
through a sequence of mediating processes, paradoxically reduce the 
correlation between treatment and outcome that SMS designs endeavour to 
maximise, for instance, Conclusion II where the treatment causes the potential 
mediator. Here, the treatment intervention into a community may actually seek 
to enhance the ‘mediating variable’ – for example, the development of the 
right mix of social capital. Thus, the intervention creates opportunities for 
bridging capital to be developed, say, by creating intra-community 
organisations, utilising and empowering community leaders (already 
possessing ‘linking’ social capital), which then empowers the community by 
creating additional linking capital for community members, that enhances their 
efforts to create bridging institutions, and so on (Hope and Karstedt, 2003). 
There is also Conclusion III – that the sum of these activities (e.g. collective 
efficacy) itself becomes the mediating variable, such that when it is controlled 
statistically, or in research design, the direct correlation between the treatment 
variable (the originating governance intervention) and the outcome variable 
(i.e. crime) disappears, even though it has actually had an important, though 
indirect, causal influence.  
 
Evidence of both these ‘threats’ to explanation is apparent from Study 4 (Hope, 
2005c). Thus, the paradox is that were the evaluation research design to control for 
these apparent threats to validity – or that an SMS review rejected the evidence from 
studies that did not seem to have these qualities – it would be likely to reject the 
influence of the treatment on the outcome when, in practice, it had a very significant 
effect. In this case, it would be the evaluation method itself, and not the intervention, 
that produced the result, thus leading to Type II error inferences – that the treatment 
had no effect, when in fact it did.  
 
A related issue in community crime prevention is that of spill-over – whether 
displacement of crime or diffusion of benefit. Space precludes a detailed discussion of 
measurement issues involved, though again, it is necessary to consider 
methodological issues concerning the validity of observations of apparent spill-over 
effects. For instance, Hope et al. (2004 – Study 8) found, paradoxically, that more 
projects achieved a greater net reduction in crime in their wider area, including a 
surrounding ‘buffer zone’ than in their specific target area. Yet this was more likely to 
be a spurious rather than a true diffusion of benefit since projects were actually part of 
bigger crime reduction initiatives covering wider areas beyond the target, and that 
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they were likely to affect the behaviour of populations of offenders, victims and 
community members in the communities beyond their relatively small target areas. 
 
Programme implementation  
 
The realist critique also points to the importance of intervention process in the 
estimation of causal effect. The process of implementation is not only crucial to a 
project but also a logical pre-requisite to evaluation – whatever the rigour of 
evaluation methodology, it will not be possible to detect the effects of an intervention 
if little or nothing has been implemented to produce those effects (Hope, 1985). 
Generally, outcomes are likely to be affected by the:   
 
1. Efficacy of crime prevention measures (this is the traditional concern of 
programme developers); 
2. Tractability of the target/community context: i.e. how easy or difficult it is to 
implement the crime prevention measures, given the characteristics of different 
environmental and community contexts; and 
3. Efficiency of the organisation of delivery: i.e. how efficient or productive are the 
agents and their procedures in implementing the intervention.  
 
Each of these independent factors is likely, separately and in combination, to interact 
to influence the probability of a specific outcome of an intervention (Hope et al., 
2004). Rather than being separate issues, the evaluation of implementation is 
necessary condition for the evaluation of outcome. Yet it is also necessary to separate 
out its effects in order to ascertain programme outcomes, or more usually failures, 
adducible to failures of implementation (Hope, 2005b).  
 
Implementation issues have arisen in most British community crime prevention 
programmes (Hope and Murphy, 1983). This has lead to two methodological 
responses: 
 
1. Process studies of implementation: evaluation studies of the CRP Reducing 
Burglary Initiative (Study 8) were obliged to undertake detailed process studies,  
moving-on from mere description and monitoring in order to explain specific 
implementation outcomes, provide inputs to cost-effectiveness studies (Bowles and 
Pradiptyo, 2004) and generate a set of conditions that might account for differential 
impacts. For instance, the relative failure of projects to reduce burglary was related 
to a differential willingness to abandon and adapt initial intervention plans which, in 
turn, was related to the organisation of the project and the characteristics of the lead 
agency. In particular, projects that were dominated by the police seemed notably 
inflexible, persisting with ineffectual implementation plans that eventually lead to 
failure (Hope et al., 2004).  
2. Measurement of project intensity of action: following pioneering work by Ekblom et 
al. (1996, Study 6), evaluation studies in the RBI (Study 8) developed various 
quantitative measures of project intensity of action which could measure the 
amount, quantity, duration and tempo of implementation. 
 
Hope et al. (2004, Study 8) combined both of the above approaches to create an 
Intensity of Action score – consisting of a periodic, quantitative, cumulative measure 
of the impact of implementation during and beyond the duration of the project. 
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Observational data on implementation, administrative and cost data were combined 
into a Calendar of Action from which a quantitative measure could be derived, which 
was immensely useful in econometric, time-series analysis of programme impact 
(Crawley and Hope, 2003).  
 
Conclusion: heterogeneity and selection bias 
 
The realist critique both illustrates and succumbs to two methodological problems of 
non-experimental research that have a major effect on the inferences to be drawn from 
evaluation research: heterogeneity and selection bias. Contexts, interventions and 
outcomes are heterogeneous (as the realists argue) but non-experimental evaluation 
research also needs to build-into its design and analysis protection against inferential 
error due to manifold selection bias (of which realists are wholly guilty). As both 
interventions and evaluations are embedded in the social world, quasi-experimental 
research design is insufficiently powerful on its own to isolate generalisable estimates 
of programme effect free from selection bias. Building on the work of Heckman 
(2001) in micro-econometrics, evaluation research needs to model selection effects, 
isolate unique programme effects, and identify heterogeneous outcomes (Figure 7). 
 
 
  
Figure 7 
 
 
 
 
Hope et al. (2004) for instance, fitted separate multivariate time-series models to the 
crime trends in each project area in their study, with appropriate specifications for the 
particular properties of the time series in each project (capturing heterogeneous local 
patterning of crime), and then estimated unique project effects (measured by the 
Intensity of Project Action variable), net of ex ante projections of the crime trend due 
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to other influences. Ekblom et al. (1996) carried out a highly-sophisticated study to 
adjust observed data to account for a large range of selection biases and 
heterogeneous effects that could not by controlled by research design. 
 
In conclusion, what may be needed to advance understanding of the impact of 
community crime prevention are inferential statistical models that seek to estimate 
selection bias and heterogeneity – properties fundamentally affecting evaluability – 
using counter-factual causal reasoning to underpin micro-econometric analysis 
(Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8 
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